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TEAMWORKING AND THE ‘SHARPENING’ OF PERIPHERAL VISION  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Managers and organizations are normally focussed on a number of key issues and 
targets, such as strategic positioning, operations, competitors, internal processes, human 
relations, etc. Focus is fundamental to effective exploitation. Focus, however, carries 
with it some attendant risks. It may, for example, lead to an underestimation of critical 
moves taking place at the periphery outside the focus of attention. In such instances, 
peripheral vision becomes crucial to organizational survival. In this paper, we discuss 
how teams and teamworking may help re-educate attention and in so doing ‘sharpen’ 
peripheral vision in organizational contexts. A typology is built, which specifies how 
different types of teams deal with focus and periphery in practice. Next, we discuss the 
specific cases of the groups that are most oriented towards the periphery to uncover how 
they manage collective action and collective imagination. The paper finishes with a 
number of practical suggestions derived from the previous theoretical work. Six 
strategic practices are critically analyzed: zooming, improvisation, bricolage, scenario 
thinking, wild cards and weak signals. 
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In a 2004 issue of Long Range Planning edited by Day and Schoemaker [1], a group of 
scholars discussed the interesting notion of the periphery with a special focus on 
peripheral vision. The periphery was defined as “wherever your attention is not” [2]. 
Because the dominant mantra in strategy-speak has traditionally been 'focus, focus, 
focus', there has been a tendency to ignore events and things occurring at the periphery 
of our attention. Yet, the periphery is ever elusive. 'Each time you turn your head to 
look at it, you create a new "periphery"'. [1] In this sense, the periphery is a paradoxical 
notion that can never be fully grasped. In fact, whenever one turns one’s attention to the 
periphery, it becomes a focus of attention and a new periphery is created: a way of 
seeing is a way of not seeing. The tension between the center and the periphery is ever 
enigmatic and thus provides an interesting topic for analysis. Focus and clarity, or 
attention to a center tend to be highly regarded notions in the fields of strategy and 
organization theory – as expressed in such concepts as niches, targeting, fit and 
consistency [3]. All these concepts give an idea of the narrowing and channeling of 
energies and resources, the creating of strategic alignments, and the centering and 
focusing of attention. The periphery, in contrast, precisely because it is peripheral, has 
received less attention. Concepts such as boundary scanning have certainly something 
in common with the notion of the periphery, but they do not fully capture the elusive 
character of a genuine peripheral vision.  
 
Our aim in this paper is to contribute to the exploration and understanding of this vague, 
shadowy periphery and the type of peripheral vision required to deal with it. More 
specifically, we analyze why and how teams may constitute a particularly useful locus 
for ‘sharpening’ peripheral vision – the paradoxical challenge involved in ‘sharpening’ 
the periphery should be noted here. Sharpening here is taken to mean the ‘heightening 
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of sensitivity’ to peripheral events and activities and not a narrowing of focal attention. 
With this goal in mind the paper is structured as follows. We start with an analysis of 
the nature of the periphery. Then we discuss why it is important for strategy studies. 
Next, the role of teamworking on the exploration of the periphery is considered. The 
differential impact of distinct types of teams on the improvement of peripheral vision is 
especially emphasized. In this way, we seek to contribute to the strategy literature 
through the analysis of how different types of groups nurture the development of 
peripheral vision and therefore facilitate the strategic learning process. The first step 
with that purpose is the better understanding of the notion of the periphery.       
 
 
WHAT IS THE PERIPHERY? 
In this section, we discuss the nature of the periphery and peripheral vision. Peripheral 
vision is a cultivated sensitivity for attending to the hidden, the obscured, and the 
overlooked. It involves a re-education of attention away from focal objects and events to 
the marginal activities, the cognitively repressed, and the seemingly incidental events 
surrounding them. To better understand the nature of the periphery and peripheral 
vision, the physiology of the human eye needs to be properly understood. As 
emphasized by students of visual intelligence [4] and noted by Day and Schoemaker 
[1], the neural retina contains two types of cells: rods and cones. Cone cells are 
concentrated near the center and are responsible for registering color and detail in good 
conditions of illumination. These are the cells that aid focal vision. Rod cells, on the 
other hand, are located around the edges of the retina and function better in poor 
lightning or when outlines are ‘blurry’ particularly at the periphery of vision. They are 
low-level weak signal detectors more sensitive to change and movement than to shape 
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or colour. For this reason, we are more sensitive to movement at the ‘corners-of-our-
eyes’ than we are at the center. What is also interesting to note is that the retina contains 
many more rod cells than cone cells: about 120 million rod cells and no more than 6 
million cone cells. This 20:1 ratio suggests that, from an evolutionary perspective, 
information gathered from the periphery is at least no less important than from the 
center. In fact, the human eye is designed to help people notice weak signals and sense 
potential attack from visual domains outside the focus of attention.  
 
If the periphery is where your attention is not, then, it must of necessity be apprehended 
elliptically and never directly or frontally. As soon as one turns one’s attention to the 
periphery, one creates a new periphery. In this sense, the periphery is an inevitable 
‘other’. Center and periphery co-define one another dialectically. As Capra [5] puts it, 
“by the very act of focusing our attention on any one concept, we create its opposite.” 
The act of focusing creates a zone of exclusion that we subsequently call the periphery 
and this is where ignorance lives [6]. Thus, when an organization focuses on one 
business model or one strategic initiative it is creating new blinds spots that prevents the 
development of alternative business models and strategies. Following March’s 
distinction between exploration and exploitation, organizations, in this sense, need to be 
simultaneously focussed on exploiting its competitive advantages and on exploring its 
peripheral blindspots [7]. In summary, the periphery is that elusive realm that 
disappears when we deliberately look at it. In gestalt terms, when we focus on the 
periphery, figure turns ground and ground turns figure.  
 
This paradoxical, antithetical nature of the organizational eye, leads to a challenge both 
for managers and researchers: how can organizations ‘sharpen’ their peripheral vision? 
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The notion of ‘sharpening’ is paradoxical in itself, in the sense that the periphery, as we 
have seen, lies in the realm of the shadowy, the blurred and the gray. Yet, it is vital to 
our comprehension since it provides the background context, the vague penumbra 
surrounding our objects of attention that allows meaning and coherence to emerge. 
Despite the frequent insistence that organizations need to attend to the periphery, there 
are many restrictions to improving peripheral vision. These constraints exist at the 
individual, group and organizational levels. At the individual level, people tend to force 
the world to fit their existing cognitive frames. Mental filters help people select the 
information that confirms their expectations and validate their beliefs and to ignore 
information that disconfirms or invalidates their assumptions [8].  At the group level, 
well known defensive processes such as groupthink, establish what the group can think 
about and what should or should not be expressed [9]. At the organizational level, the 
development of a dominant logic tends to obscure possibilities lying outside this logic 
[10]. All these defensive routines act selectively as blinders. They reinforce the existing 
mindset and infuse existence with stability. They reduce ambiguity, render the 
unfamiliar familiar and, in this way, tame the chaos that surrounds us. It is the in-built 
temptation for preferring precision, clarity and orderliness that makes the vague and 
‘blurry’ periphery ever so important in today’s organizational environment. This is the 
topic of the next section.             
             
WHY DOES THE PERIPHERY MATTER? 
The need to impose order and stability in an otherwise fluxing and disorderly world is a 
deeply acquired human instinct. From an early age we are socialized and educated to 
prefer simple, compact, and precise forms and to generally ignore vague, incoherent and 
inarticulate forms in our perceptual apprehension. We lack what the poet John Keats 
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calls a ‘negative capability’: ‘when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, 
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason’ (letter, from John 
Keats to G. and T. Keats, Dec. 1817). This impatience with disorder is a major 
impediment to the systematic cultivation of peripheral vision. The processes of framing 
discussed in the previous section suggests that individuals, teams and organizations tend 
to feel more comfortable with well-established frames of understanding than they are 
with breaking them. The key problem with this is that they may make organizational life 
appear more clear but, in so doing, insulate organizations from the messiness and 
complexities of the real world. Miller, for instance, studied how previously exceptional 
organizations brought about their own fall by becoming more and more focused and 
hence less and less in touch with the outside world [11]. Baumard and Starbuck 
discussed how organizations may often not learn from past mistakes because individuals 
slant interpretations of ambiguous sequences of events to conform to their own 
expectations [12]. The conclusions of these studies are noteworthy: the interaction 
between existing frames of reference and individual interests may recreate and reinforce 
a particular world-view inside the organization. The clarity and stability of the 
“recreated” internal world may however be at odds with the dynamics of the external 
‘real’ world. One of the reasons why the periphery is important, then, has to do with the 
need for constant ‘reality-testing’: to constantly challenge organizational focus and the 
existing frames of mind to see if they match up with the real world. 
 
Organizing, having to do with order and routine, tends to favor focal vision. The core 
activities of organizing are sense-making, structuring, and relating [13]. Organizational 
sense-making, in particular, is very much about censoring (i.e., creating boundaries and 
defining what is core and what is periphery) and centering (i.e., establishing an axis of 
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meaning and authority). Focused organizations tend to become better in doing what they 
do as times goes by because routines help improve efficiency. They exploit existing 
capabilities and act in the context of a dominant logic, i.e. the (often implicit) theory of 
competition and value creation embedded in an organization’s thinking and practice. 
The dominant logic is the conceptual lens through which the organization sees the 
world. When the world changes and the lens remains the same, it can become a blinder 
that makes it difficult for the organization to understand the change processes taking 
place [10]. This focus on the exploitation of a dominant logic may be positive if the 
environment is stable. When it is not, however, exploitation needs to be complemented 
with a focus on exploration with a view to challenging the dominant logic. Exploration 
requires peripheral vision and a deliberate departure from established practices. The 
dialectic between exploration and exploitation hence captures the tension between 
peripheral and focal vision.   
 
As noted by Day and Schoemaker, the periphery is important because it is where major 
risks and opportunities can be found [2]. The authors use a metaphor introduced by 
Andy Grove, the past CEO of Intel, to illustrate this point: when spring comes, snow 
starts to melt where it is most exposed, i.e., at the periphery. The periphery, then, is a 
zone of vulnerability and open exposure. Weak signals from such zones of exposure 
may inform an organization about impending changes in competitive landscapes. 
Domino’s, Amazon and Southwest, for example, started at the periphery of established 
industry sectors in an undefined space of intersection between industries, mindsets and 
technologies. Today they have become key players and re-definers of industry sectors. 
This idea that significant changes often begin relatively unnoticed at the periphery is not 
new. In art, for instance, the Impressionist movement, which is now very much a part of 
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the establishment, and which began in the 1860s was avoided and shunned by the main 
art galleries in France. In all these cases the process of melting is so powerful that it 
eventually reaches the center and effects major commercial/cultural transformations. 
Former peripheral activities take over the center: blogging and video gaming were once 
peripheral but now are becoming mainstream activities in our digital societies. And 
what is interesting is that these activities can be understood as parts of a wider and 
deeper process: the process of digitalization of societies, something that may be a source 
of further fundamental changes in terms of education, communication, and cultural 
renewal [14]. What this tells us is that much of social, cultural and economic and 
political transformations begin at the periphery of awareness and then gradually but 
almost inexorably seep into the center of attention. Awareness of peripheral happenings 
is thus critical if organizations are to develop foresight and to anticipate the future.         
 
The relevance of peripheral vision for organizational strategizing is a topic to be studied 
but some areas where it may matter most include: (a) the identification of new 
customers; (b) the identification of threats and opportunities in emerging technologies; 
(c) the problem of dealing with rivals who speak a different language; (d) the problem 
of intelligence failures [15]. The next section is devoted to the way teams may 
contribute to increase attention to the periphery.       
 
PERIPHERAL VISION THROUGH TEAMS 
As we have seen, the past experience of individuals, teams and organizations tends to 
leave them with a legacy of inflexibility. They learn to focus and to deal with common 
threats and opportunities through an evolutionary process. The result of such a process 
of learning and reinforcement can be quite useful if the present is not much different 
 11
from the past. But if the competition changes – and chances are that it will in our hyper-
competitive global world – past learning may lead to future disaster. The very strategic 
capabilities that led to success in the past may become an impediment for the future. 
The process of change and adaptation may be made especially difficult for organizations 
because, contrary to individuals, they do not have general purpose sensors, comparable 
to the human eye, to detect transformations taking place at the periphery. Because of the 
way that organizations are functionally structured, there is a tendency to rely on 
specialized focal knowledge and this generates a type of tunnel vision that dominates 
over the kind of peripheral vision that is increasingly needed. One possibility for 
overcoming this limitation, according to Winter, is for the CEO to be the peripheral 
viewer par excellence since he/she is the only person in the organization with the 
authority to redeploy or redirect collective attention [15].  
 
In this section, we extend Winter’s idea to suggest that, more than making use of the 
peripheral vision of the individuals within the system, organizations have much to gain 
from using the peripheral vision of teams of people. Or more precisely, of some types of 
organizational teams (see Table 1). The relocation of the locus of peripheral vision from 
the individual to the team has several advantages. First, and as discussed before, 
individuals are subjected to a number of cognitive limitations. CEOs are no exception 
[16]. Despite their evident strategic role, they too have ‘blind-spots’ that they are often 
not aware of. Because of the inherent diversity of understanding of team members, 
teams are less susceptible to these ‘blind-spots’. Second, well functioning teams may be 
more competent than the sum of their members in diagnosing relevant issues [17]. 
Third, peripheral issues are ambiguous and paradoxical by definition and people need to 
interact in order to deal with ambiguity. By encouraging exploration and alternative 
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interpretations and hence deferring premature definition of problem-situations teams 
may help to inculcate the ‘negative capability’ required for inducing peripheral 
awareness and vision. Reaching consensus takes longer in effective teams because 
doubts, concerns with reliability of facts and with perceptions of priorities are given 
sufficient airing and this helps to instill a resistance to premature closure. As such, the 
team may be a more fruitful forum to deal with ambiguity than the individual [18]. 
Fourth, it has been argued that teams can be more creative than large organizations, 
because they may be better able to perceive the potentialities of the periphery [19]. 
Fifth, organizations sometimes create teams with the specific purpose of exploring 
boundaries, which may be thought of as one of the forms of peripheral initiative [20].  
The scenario-planning group in Shell, for instance, is one such example of this kind of 
initiative.     
 
 We are not suggesting that every team is effective in scrutinizing the periphery. As 
depicted in Table 1, some teams simply don’t work whereas others are competent in 
focusing on tasks but not in opening up their vision. As such, some individuals may be 
more competent than some teams. With this in mind, and in preparing the terrain for 
future research, we will discuss why, theoretically at least, teams may constitute a fertile 
soil for cultivating peripheral vision.                               
 
----------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
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To explore the relationship between teamworking and vision, we consider that there can 
be four types of teams, depending on how lines of attention are emphasized. Some 
teams may combine focal and peripheral vision. We called these minimally-structured 
teams. Others display a focal vision but not a peripheral vision. These were called 
execution teams. A third type is constituted by teams with developed peripheral vision 
but not equivalent focal vision. These have been designated as immersion teams. And 
finally, a fourth possibility is constituted by those teams lacking both focal and 
peripheral vision. These are called dysfunctional teams. This typology should be viewed 
as an exercise of disciplined imagination rather than an attempt to provide a definitive 
structure of clear cut categories [21]. In the rest of this section we will distinguish the 
four types of teams according to their distinguishing visual ‘eye’.    
 
Minimally-structured teams. Minimal structures are designs based upon three 
elements: (1) coordination by action, made possible by (2) a minimal set of rules and on 
(3) a shared social objective [22]. Minimal structures can be conceived as a small set of 
big rules, or as a form of organizational structuring aimed at enabling individuals to 
create organizational value through flexible action adjusted to the requirements of the 
situation. These are the teams potentially most conducive to corporate rejuvenation 
because they stimulate individuals to initiate purposeful action on a daily basis [23]. 
Minimally-structured teams facilitate the development of both peripheral and focal 
vision. This is because they have a clear goal but not a clear path for attaining the goal. 
According to Hackman, the clarification of ends without the clarification of means tends 
to stimulate the best of teamworking [24]. The team has a clear direction combined with 
ample space for innovation and exploration. This is the type of structure that enables 
discovery without loosing focus. Members of minimally-structured teams will be 
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pressed to remain focused, because there is a clear goal, as well as a number of other 
drivers of focal vision, including milestones and responsibilities. But, at the same time, 
the possibilities for action are ample: behaviors are not prescribed, paths are open to 
exploration, and improvisation is embedded in the system. Minimal structures, in this 
sense, facilitate both convergence and divergence, attention to the center and openness 
to the periphery. The similarities between minimal structuring and jazz performance, 
illustrate the potentialities of this type of designs for the re-education of attention, 
maintaining focus but continuously oscillating to and from the periphery [25]. What this 
oscillation does is to develop a heightened sensitivity to figure and ground and this is 
well understood in the development of any artistic capabilities as Ehrenzweig [26] 
points out. ‘When the art-school student takes up drawing he is made to watch not only 
the outline of the object he draws (in other words the figure), but also the negative form 
which the figure cuts out from the background’. In other words, they are encouraged to 
see how the means (i.e., the negative strokes of the pen) affect the overall impression of 
the formed figure (i.e., the ends). This need to combine the encouragement of personal 
initiative with a shared vision has been described as a crucial feature of creative 
organizations [27].      
 
Immersion teams. Organizational efforts to reach the periphery tend to be timid. 
Efforts for understanding potential customers, for example, are often based on second 
hand evidence collected through marketing research. Trends are explored in cold 
databases through ‘mining’. Immersion, on the contrary, refers to sharing the experience 
of the periphery.  
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The idea of immersion has to do with ‘diving into’ a different reality. It represents, in 
this sense, an effort of collective imagination, or the inter-active exploration of future 
possibilities from present experiences. Brown analyzed the theory and practice of 
immersion and suggested that organizations may gain peripheral vision through the 
creation of cultures in the periphery that are different from those at the core [14]. He 
explained how he gained a new understanding of video and computer games: 
‘Understanding the periphery is often a difficult process. When I first saw the modern 
video and computer games, I was shocked by their gore and violence, as are many 
people from my generation. Because of this, I may have dismissed them too quickly. It 
was not until I was invited by gaming enthusiasts to spend a year immersed in this 
periphery that I realised the power of these games and managed to go beneath my 
superficial reaction to recognise that the real focus of players was not on content but on 
context’ (p.144).            
 
Immersion can be both an individual and a group process. Immersed individuals are 
those that become members of some peripheral entity. Immersed teams are those that 
are created and maintained with the purpose of staying at the periphery – at least for 
some time. The notion of ambidexterity captures the necessity of organizations to probe 
the periphery without deviating from the business at hand [28]. That is why while the 
rest of the organization is clearly focussed the immersed teams may remain unfocussed 
by design. They are set up to enrich the organization with peripheral vision, not to see 
reality through the focal lenses of the organization. Immersed teams, however, are 
sometimes difficult to maintain due to centripetal forces from the ‘normal’ organization 
[20]. Conflict of priorities may occur and this may lead to compromising the peripheral 
capacity of the team.                          
 16
 
Execution teams. Many organizational teams, perhaps the majority, are execution 
teams. They are clearly-focused entities designed to execute well-defined functions. 
They are expected to exploit established knowledge and to execute with competence, 
not to bring about new ideas or new angles of vision. They are expected to be focussed; 
peripheral vision is not to be cultivated by them. The virtues of competent execution 
have been extolled in the recent past. Brilliantly formulated strategies are irrelevant 
unless they are implemented with an equivalent competence [29]. Execution teams are, 
hence, teams of focussed implementers.          
 
Dysfunctional teams. Finally, some teams lack focus and are neither able to achieve 
competent execution nor to effectively explore the periphery. If some groups work, 
there are others than don’t [30]. The latter have been unable to become well-functioning 
teams, and created a dynamic that transformed the whole into less than the sum of its 
elements. We call these teams ‘dysfunctional’ but they correspond to both the 
dysfunctional and the conflictual types in Jarzabkowski and Searle’s typology [31]. 
These are, in short, teams with low capacity for collective action. By collective action 
we mean, following Jarzabkowski and Searle, the ability to work together while 
maintaining the capacity for questioning and debating. The experience of teamworking 
in these collectivities tends to be a source of dissatisfaction. There are many possible 
reasons for the formation of dysfunctional teams, including unclear rules and 
incompetent leaders, power and politics or low capacity to engage in action. Conflicting 
teams do not contribute to enhance the organizational eye. They are engaged in internal 
political tensions that prevent focus on external objects, be they at the center or at the 
periphery .                 
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The above typology suggests that two types of teams may be competent in the 
exploration of the periphery: minimally-structured teams and immersion teams. In the 
next section, we discuss how these teams may contribute to ‘sharpen’ peripheral vision.            
 
‘SHARPENING’ PERIPHERAL VISION THROUGH TEAMWORKING 
Day and Schoemaker proposed several possible approaches for improving the peripheral 
vision. These included the expansion of focus, asking the right questions, experimenting 
and immersing in the periphery, and using technology to be more agile. In this section, 
we discuss the different means that minimally-structured and immersed teams may 
employ for developing peripheral vision. To understand the difference between these 
groups, we will juxtapose Table 1 with two additional dimensions: collective action and 
collective imagination (see Table 2). Collective action was defined in the previous 
section as the ability to work together while maintaining the capacity for questioning 
and debating. By collective imagination we refer to the team’s capacity to build on the 
creative skills of their individual members to stretch the number of possibilities 
envisioned by the group.           
 
----------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
Table 2 suggests four possibilities: practical imagination, corresponding to minimally-
structured teams; fundamental imagination, corresponding to immersed teams; practical 
action, corresponding to execution teams; and inaction corresponding to dysfunctional 
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teams. The two latter types will not be discussed in detail, because they are not 
interesting from the perspective of the periphery. This does not mean that they are not 
interesting from the perspective of theory or practice. On the contrary, practical 
intelligence plays a fundamental role in real-world pursuits [32]. In the rest of this 
section, we consider the cases of minimally-structured and immersed groups. The 
possibilities discussed below regarding each group are not meant to be complete, but 
representative. It should also be considered that, because knowledge is both leaky and 
sticky [33], these ideas may help to improve peripheral vision or they may not. In other 
words their knowledge may be diffused or retained in the teams that produced it. As 
indicated in Table 3, there are as many good reasons to expect these suggestions to 
facilitate peripheral vision, as to avoid excessive optimism regarding their effects.       
 
----------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
The case of minimally-structured teams 
Minimally-structured teams help to re-educate attention to the periphery by combining 
collective action and collective imagination. Action, and experimental action in 
particular, triggers imagination. Three strategies for developing peripheral vision in 
minimally-structured teams can be identified: zooming, improvisation and bricolage.  
 
Zooming. Large collectivities (such as firms and nations) sometimes suddenly collapse 
for systemic reasons. Hurst and Zimmerman discussed the cases of GM, IBM and the 
Soviet Union as illustrations of processes of change that they compared with the 
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ecocycle [34]. The ecocycle of such a complex system as a forest, for example, is 
composed of myriad interactions between subsystems. The overall ecocycle is an 
emergent quality of the system, produced by interactions at the lower levels. Many of 
the subsystems have fractal qualities, meaning that they resemble the system as a whole. 
Existing research suggests that something which is not perceived by the system, may be 
perceived at the level of some subsystem. For example, people at lower levels in an 
organization may have, because they are nearer to the ‘coal-face’, a clearer grasp of an 
impending disaster than the top management team. Engineers at NASA, for instance, 
were better positioned to perceive the corrosive effects of the change from an 
engineering culture to a managerial one [35]. In their work on surprises, Cunha, Clegg 
and Kamoche made the same point: what comes as a surprise at one level of the 
organization could be well known at other levels [36]. Learning from ecocycles and 
organizational surprises leads to a couple of possibilities: organizations may gain better 
peripheral vision by creating teams that zoom in and out, from top to bottom. These 
teams may circulate ideas that already exist in some parts of the organization or at its 
borders, and let the periphery become more apparent. By gaining different perspectives 
of the organization, people in a diverse team may better understand and appreciate what, 
in other circumstances, may be perceived and dismissed as irrelevant or local. The 
process of zooming, or of collective travelling across the upper and lower, internal and 
external boundaries, between action and reflection, may help participants gain a 
systemic perspective and bring to the center important insights from the periphery. 
Zooming teams, composed of people from different parts of the organization and 
outsiders (clients, suppliers), combine the internal and external forms of sensing and 
operationalizes several of the possibilities presented by Winter (2004) for improving the 
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peripheral vision (e.g., consider new sensing areas, improve the organization’s general 
purpose sensors).             
 
Improvisation. Improvisation occurs when spontaneous action takes place in the 
absence of prior planning. Improvisation can contribute to the development of 
peripheral vision because it explores and thrives in the cracks of planning. When plans 
(based on established assumptions) are not adequate to action, people decide on the spur 
of the moment to respond in any way they can to a pressing demand. Improvisation in 
the context of minimal structures represents a pendulum movement between the center 
and the periphery, the plan and the circumstance, structure and imagination. 
Improvising people are not executing an exercise of fundamental imagination but, 
rather, exploring the potentialities of structure as a source of change.  
 
Improvisers use the structure to coordinate collective action, which propels collective 
imagination. Imagination is the output of inter-action and it flourishes at the intersection 
between structure and the lack of it [37]. The association between improvisation and 
peripheral vision suggests that ‘sense-and-respond’ organizations require more freedom 
of action and attention to movements at the periphery than the traditional ‘make-and-
sell’ organizations [38]. As noted by Clegg, “improvisations pose unique opportunities 
for insight and innovation among routines as they break through to the other side of 
structure.” [39]. Breaking through to the other side, as the song goes, may open new 
doors of perception.      
 
Bricolage. Bricolage refers to the invention of means from a limited set of available 
resources to solve unanticipated problems. It is a form of practical imagination, in the 
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sense that it manifests itself in how people organize their everyday activities to 
accomplish their goals and how they reorganize to adapt when something deviates from 
normality. This form of practical imagination may therefore refer to how people 
reorganize their resources in face of, among distinct possibilities, opportunities detected 
at the periphery. Bricoleurs are agents of peripherality when they deviate from the 
normal use of resources to different, often unconventional uses. Bricolage experiences 
at the periphery may renew the organization’s understanding not only of its resource 
base but also of its strategies of action [40]. It therefore contains an interesting potential 
of collective imaginative action.           
  
 
The case of immersed teams 
Immersed teams help to re-educate attention to the periphery by stimulating collective 
imagination. Three strategies for developing peripheral vision in immersed teams can be 
devised: scenarios, wild cards and weak signals.  
 
Scenarios. Scenarios may be viewed as processes of thinking through alternative stories 
about how an organization’s environment may evolve into the future. In its essence 
scenario thinking is a social learning process, established around strategic 
conversations, reflexivity and adaptive learning. With scenarios, a team is not trying to 
predict the future but rather looking for a deeper understanding of the forces operating 
in the organization’s environment, namely those incubating at the periphery and 
journeying to the center.  Scenarios may be valuable to the extent that they stimulate a 
deep appreciation of the social forces operating outside the focus of the organization. 
Scenarios can be cognitive exercises of imagination but, in line with the notion of 
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immersion discussed in the previous section, they can also combine cognition with 
actual experience. Immersed people may produce more informed extrapolations of how 
the present periphery may become tomorrow’s centrality.       
 
Wild cards. A radical form of scenario thinking consists in pushing imagination to its 
limits. This can be attained through the process of building wild cards. Wild cards refer 
to low-probability, high-impact events that might be introduced into standard 
strategizing reflection in order to increase the ability of organizations to anticipate and 
adapt to surprises arising in turbulent business environments [41]. They voluntarily 
bring the periphery to the center. The fact that sudden and unique incidents may 
constitute turning points in the evolution of a certain trend makes them critical 
challenges for management. As intellectual objects, these dramatic discontinuities are 
notoriously difficult to predict; and because they are new to the world, are very hard to 
translate into concrete (re)action guidelines. They arise persistently but never in the 
same way. In a post-9/11 world understanding, anticipating and preparing for wild cards 
constitutes a possibility for stretching the imagination to the farthest reaches of the 
periphery. 
 
Weak signals.  As is often observed, most disruptive threats come from the periphery. 
Established competitors build a sort a collective rationality based upon the current 
drivers of the market. They are not typically interested in eroding these drivers because 
they are sustained by them. On the contrary, competitors from the periphery have 
nothing to lose from the erosion of the established structure of competition. Hence the 
need for incumbents to listen to what Menon and Tomkins gracefully designated as the 
sounds of ‘little cat feet’ of new competitors and new trends of competition [42]. 
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Changes on the far side of the periphery may silently approach the center. The lack of 
audible signals may, however, distract the competition. Then, when the movement is 
noticed, it may be too late to develop an effective counter-movement. The journeys 
from the periphery of such companies as Dell or Domino's illustrate this point. To 
facilitate the process of listening to the little cat feet, some companies developed a 
number of ideas. IBM, for example, created a group called Crow’s Nest to develop 
market intelligence at the periphery. Its goal: like a ‘crow’s nest’ in a ship, detect new 
land and dangerous reefs ahead. This group, supported by a technology launched in 
2001, called the WebFountain, was able to devise a number of weak signals from the 
periphery and to work on them. For example, whereas national press was spreading 
positive reports about the company, local press was producing more negative reports. 
The discovery of this discrepancy suggested the need to communicate better with the 
local press in order to prevent damage in the firm’s reputation in local communities.                               
  
The assumptions developed by an organization over time, may constitute a source of 
inertia and of difficulty in seeing the periphery. It is interesting to note that these six 
practices have the potential to challenge and unearth assumptions, and therefore to 
unfreeze the dominant logic. McGrath and MacMillan showed how companies may 
confound assumptions with facts and how these “facts” can be dangerous for decision 
makers [43]. Disney’s assumptions that Europeans would behave as Americans or 
Japanese, namely in terms of their eating habits, proved to be wrong, and were a source 
of dissatisfaction to Euro Disney customers. Unearthing assumptions can be facilitated 
through the constitution of diverse and well-functioning teams. As observed by Hamel, 
inviting new voices – and giving them expression and appreciation – may help 
organizations think peripherally [44].   
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CONCLUSION 
The strategy and organization literatures have repeatedly voiced the need for 
organizations to have dual strategies, in order to compete in the present while preparing 
for the future [45]. The advice regarding dual strategizing confronted managers with 
such needs as redefining and reshaping the business, making bold moves, reorganizing, 
provoking change, and so forth. These are uncontested suggestions in rapidly changing 
markets. The question, however, is not a ‘what’ but a ‘how’ question. For example: how 
can organizations make successful bold moves? The notion of peripheral vision helps to 
understand the type of action organizations may take in order to reshape themselves and 
their markets. The use of teams in exploring the ‘vast oceans of data’ at the periphery 
[42] may clarify the dynamics of change and facilitate both awareness and deep 
understanding of the winds of change.  
 
We tried to contribute to the literature in a few ways. First, we discussed the under-
explored notion of organizational periphery, adding to the relatively scarce literature on 
the topic. Second, we related teamworking and the notion of peripheral vision. Several 
types of teams were distinguished and their potential for re-educating attention was 
discussed. Third, we advanced half a dozen practical possibilities for stimulating 
peripheral vision. Fourth, we contributed to the cognitive repairs literature. Heath, 
Larrick and Klayman defined cognitive repairs as organizational practices that help to 
correct the cognitive shortcomings of individuals [46]. In this paper we focussed on 
group-based cognitive repairs. These group level repairs may complement 
organizational ones, and thus contribute to the literature that is investigating the way 
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cognitive shortcomings prevent effective management learning. We advanced a number 
of group possibilities for dealing with individual and organizational shortcomings 
through stretching the imagination in the direction of the periphery.         
 
The arguments of this paper should be read with caution. We are contributing to the 
peripheral vision literature with a number of questions rather than with well rounded 
answers. A major question should be considered with special attention: can peripheral 
vision be improved? With this paper, we advanced a number of possibilities of how 
teams may contribute for improving this capability. But we also noted that, because 
knowledge is both sticky and leaky, they should be considered as mere possibilities. 
They therefore need to be tested empirically. It should also be considered that teams are 
often constituted by similar people with similar beliefs [47]. When that is the case, 
teams will not facilitate the improvement of peripheral vision. A final self-criticism 
refers to the fact that these suggestions may be not creative enough to deal with the 
paradoxical nature of peripheral vision. Several possibilities may be explored in future 
research. These include the use of humor as a code-breaking practice, the introduction 
of voluntary disorder and interruption, and the institution of a system of Socratic 
wisdom, i.e. the recognition that we all need to know more than we do, the cultivation 
of multifocal attention and the increase of polyphonic expressiveness, i.e., allowing the 
usually silent voices to speak up [48]. In this sense, periphery is silence, another 
possibility to be explored by future research.         
 
The contribution of teams and teamworking for the re-education of attention was 
discussed as relevant from a theoretical as well as from an applied perspective. 
Theoretically, the exploration of the periphery may help to understand processes such as 
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organizational change, the creation of dominant mindsets, foresight, surprises, 
organizational cognition, and so on. In terms of application, the study of the periphery 
may suggest a number of ways of dealing with the unexpected and the ‘invisible’. 
Considering that threats and opportunities are not the focus of everyday attention, 
bringing peripheral vision to the fore may constitute a pertinent research endeavor.       
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Figure 1.  
Team, focus and the periphery 
 
 
 
 
Minimally structured teams 
 
Periphery: Yes 
Focus: Yes 
 
 
Immersion teams 
 
Periphery: Yes 
Focus: No 
 
 
Execution teams 
 
Periphery: No 
Focus: Yes 
 
 
Dysfunctional teams 
 
Periphery: No 
Focus: No 
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Figure 2.  
Teams, action and imagination  
 
 
 
Minimally-structured teams  
Practical imagination 
 
Collective action: Yes 
Collective imagination: Yes 
 
Immersion teams 
Pure imagination 
 
Collective action: No 
Collective imagination: Yes  
 
 
Execution teams  
Practical action 
 
Collective action: Yes 
Collective imagination: Yes 
 
 
Dysfunctional teams 
Inaction 
 
Collective action: Yes 
Collective imagination: Yes 
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Table 3 
Sticky/leaky knowledge, teamwork and peripheral vision 
 
 
  Sticky Leaky 
Zooming ? Diverse well-functioning 
teams are difficult to create – 
they may spend more time 
exploring their inner side 
rather than the periphery 
? ‘Thought worlds’ are 
difficult to reconcile 
? Boundaries (physical, 
psychological) may be 
difficult to cross       
? Cross-functional teams 
operate at the boundary, 
which is one form of 
periphery  
? Moving across levels 
facilitates open mindedness 
? Diverse teams help to feel 
the artificiality of boundaries 
– and to overcome them.  
Improvisation ? Improvisation is a response 
to the local; it may not travel.
? Improvisation is ephemeral 
and dissipates  
? Improvisations at the 
periphery can be routinized 
? Improvisation stretches the 
organizational repertoire of 
action, therefore inviting 
experimenting with novelty  
Bricolage ? Bricolage depends on 
personal intimacy with 
resources 
? It relies on tacit knowledge 
? It is difficult to appropriate  
? Communities of practice may 
facilitate the diffusion of 
successful bricolage 
experiments 
? The accumulation of these 
experiments may present the 
organization with unexplored 
opportunities    
Scenarios ? People think about 
‘thinkable’ scenarios 
? Scenarios may produce ‘lock 
in’ interpretations, therefore 
inhibiting peripheral vision 
? Scenarios break routine and 
mindlessness 
? They facilitate the 
exploration of distant social 
forces, operating at the 
periphery 
 
Wild cards  ? Wild card producers may be 
viewed as ‘extremists’  
? Wild cards can be viewed as 
too radical to be taken 
seriously  
? Wild cards help the 
organization to think ‘out of 
the box’ 
? They can constitute powerful 
challenges and therefore 
stimulate distant search    
 
Weak signals ? Weak signals have difficulty 
in traveling across intra-
organizational boundaries 
? Signal and noise can be 
easily mistaken 
? Weak signals may be 
interesting 
? Weak signals may represent 
a deviation to mindless 
routines    
 
